Entelechy in international relations: proposal for a historical-identity approach
Introduction
Entelechy is a metaphysical Aristotelian concept
(Aristotle 1999) that means transformation of power into action. The materialization of the possibilities
contained in every being – seed, individual, society. This ontological term suggests that every being
has an active and effective energy that makes it possible to realize its
essence and develop its potential. Every being is thus designed to seek the
realization of the potential contained in itself. Nation States are no
exception.
Inspired by this concept, this article argues that
States, as international actors, tend to behave on the world stage guided by
the desire to achieve the full development of their potential as Nations
according to their Identity and their belonging to a specific Civilisation
profile. Their behaviour is not a mere product of a raison d’état that informs rational power calculations. Rather, it
is guided by a wish of “becoming” and a “will to power”, as shall be seen
below.
The Greek etimology
of Entelechy (ἐντελέχεια) combines en
(inside) and telos (end, purpose).
This “inner purpose”, guided by “innermost” wishes, sheds light on the
country’s intentions, motivations
and strategies designed to reach its foreign policy goals.
In this sense, national identity and culture provide a
roadmap for Diplomacy. Nation States’ behaviour and strategy appear less
unpredictable if the political analyst goes deep into their identities and
understands their “ends” defined on cultural terms. States will seek to reshape
regional or global environments to the extent possible, according to their
capabilities, so as to change the status quo and blossom their national
cultures and societies. They may act as revisionist powers if the international
system hampers the fulfillment of their identity goals, and will struggle for
regional or even global dominance, if needed.
If a linguistic metaphor is allowed, every nation
contributes with its own sentences and paragraphs, with content, meaning, form
and style, to the ambiguous and anarchical discourse of human Civilisation (anarchy
is part of the Entelechy background, for it thrives on cultural relativism).
This generates a fierce dispute of narratives among cultures and civilisations
in the battlefield of minds and souls.
Beyond power politics and behaviourism, this refers to self-accomplishment
and prestige of the cultural heritage. Power, rationality, interests, alliances
and conflicts are guided by historical Identity, tools of the ultimate
objective: national development, understood as the fulfillment of civilisation
potential.
Entelechy must be duly taken into account by
International Relations theory. Digging into a nation’s History, Identity and
culture help researchers, analysts and policymakers better understand the true
parameters and goals of its behaviour and interests – that may not be rational
according to some schools of thought.
The Entelechy approach, with History and cultural
Identity as key analytical categories, provides useful heuristic and
explanatory framework to understand patterns of behaviour, strategical
interests and power calculations in international relations.
The primacy of culture and national Identity over behaviourism and rationalism of
political and economic power calculations demands greater space for
Anthropology and Social Psychology as guides for History, geoeconomics and
geopolitics. This approach may enrich the present analytical, explanatory and
interpretative framework in International Relations with new methods and
problematizations, providing new theoretical possibilities not addressed by the
mainstream academic tradition.
Without falling into simplifying determinisms, it is
possible to state that a country’s foreign policy is a projection of its
socio-cultural and historical configuration. Napoleon, Bismarck and
geopolitical theorists understood that each country practices the Diplomacy of
its Geography. Pierre Renouvin and J-B. Duroselle (1991), inspired by the new
historiography of the School of the Annals (Burke 1991), highlighted the
importance of “deep forces”, both material – economics, geography, demography –
and immaterial – “national sentiment”, nationalism – in the making of foreign
policy.
The purpose of this article is
thus to propose Entelechy as a constructive
approach to International Relations, with focus on History and Identity
as major factors of Nation State behaviour, rationality and strategy. The
philosophical and theoretical features of this approach will be briefly
presented in the following sections. Empirical researches will be suggested
with a view to historical testing and validation, including in the light of the
“Clash of Civilisations” hypothesis, which will be critically addressed. The
article also analyses the case of Brazil, whose traditional foreign policy is
determined by its development needs and inspired by its socio-cultural
background, especially its ethnical miscegenation and tropicality.
I – Areas for empirical research on Entelechy
The Entelechy approach sheds
light on national interests and long-term aspirations, which are relatively
permanent beyond changes in domestic political systems and diplomatic
strategies. From this historical background, nourished by civilisation sources
and heritages claimed over centuries or even millennia, derive territorial
ambitions, rivalries, alliances, imperialisms, pan-“isms”.
Some case studies could be
envisaged.
An approach with emphasis on
Entelechy would allow to understand the global behavior of the USA as
determined by the values of a bourgeois, capitalist, liberal-democratic, and
technicist-industrial civilisational matrix. Its behaviour is driven by the
confidence on a “manifest destiny” that emerges from Protestant capitalist
culture and ethics (Weber 2004). The “great commission” for spreading the
Gospel, led by salvationist missionaries towards “Gentiles”, is reinterpreted
in non-spiritual areas, producing a messianic “superior” mindset designed to
“save the world”. Freedom, human rights, economic and political liberalism and
democracy, inherited from the British matrix (see “transplanted people” below),
are core Western Civilisation values championed by the US.
Departing from the “containment”
policy of the Cold War, the US National Security Strategy in the mid-1990s
pushed for “engagement and enlargement” (White House 1996). The document
explicitly establishes as national security strategy goals to bolster
prosperity and to promote democracy around the world. Those values may be
interpreted as the earthly, secular translation of the “great commission” in a
semantics of power and socioeconomic and institutional organization, a
civilizing and conversion mission on a global scale.
The pillars of the Western
Civilisation – Christian “mandate”, Roman Empire institutions and rational
Greek thought – help explain how the USA pictures itself and the world and are
a guide to understanding its foreign policy. As the major representative of the
Western Civilisation, particularly the Judeo-Christian matrix – interpreted by
a Prostestant Anglo-Saxon reading –,
there may be a tendency to look at the heirs of Asian, Orthodox Christian and
Islamic religious and social matrices as incompatible with Western values,
“existential threats” to be contained.
Likewise, the Entelechy approach
could help understand the long term reasons and strategies of Russia, heir to
the Byzantine empire (the “third Rome”?) and Tsarism (Tsar derives from
Caesar), together with its projections of power and interests in Eurasia and
the Middle East. Could the East-West Great Power competition – the Cold War and
its resurgence in the XXIst century – be a late and awkward manifestation, with
all the caveats, of the rivalry
between Rome and Constantinopla?
The same ambitions of power and
prestige underlie the tsarism of Peter the Great, Soviet imperialism and the
reconstruction of military might brought about by Putin after the USSR
collapse. Since ancient times, what today is Russia has always had a
multi-ethnic character, with a strong Greek influence, its strategic interests
extending from Eastern Europe to Western and Northern Asia, including the Black
Sea and Crimea. The aristocratic and autocratic political system, the
territorial expansion, the economic-commercial interdependence with Germany,
the invasions of its own territory and its capacity for resistance and
reconstruction are features present since the Middle Ages. Cultural
westernization is a process that goes back to Peter the Great and Catarina,
although “extreme” tendencies of liberalism and democracy have been
traditionally stifled. Moreover, Russia has always sought alliances against
attempts at hegemony in the European Hinterland – against the Ottoman Empire,
Austrian-Hungary Empire, France, Germany, NATO.
As for China, one of the oldest
Civilisations, an Entelechy-focused approach would highlight the remarkable
influence on its international behaviour of its four-thousand-year imperial and
dynastic identity, its inventive capacity (paper, gunpowder, press, medical and
agricultural techniques; today cyber, artificial intelligence and 5G), its
military might and strategic interests, including maritime dominance in the
South China Sea and exchanges with the Arab and African continents. Martin
Jacques (2011) calls China a “Civilisation state”, and affirms that the
Eurocentric (or “Western-centric”) approach fails to undestand it using its own
yardstick.
The solid administrative capacity
of a strong centralized State that preserved the unity of the country since
IIIrd century BC, together with the importance attached to education –
Confucian and Taoist heritage – and the authoritarian political system are key
features of its civilisation. Likewise, the ability to extend trade and
production networks, from the ancient silk route to the current “belt and road
initiative”, in close connection with Asian, Arab and African markets and
societies. Considering this millenial productive and technological capacity,
powerful administrative efficiency, planning capacity and regional and global
expansion of its strategic-military interests, combined with the century-old
patience to overcome and react to the humiliation imposed by Western powers in
the XIXth century, the rise to the status of world superpower is hardly a
surprise.
The Entelechy approach is also
useful for studying the behavior of European States, such as Germany, with its
economic-commercial and political unification and military expansion in the
XIXth and XXth centuries; in France, Charlemagne’s heritage, together with the
Enlightenment, encyclopedists and revolutionaries; the origins of European
integration with the Holy Roman Empire of Charles V; the United Kingdom, matrix
of the Anglo-Saxon Civilisation, liberal-democratic and bourgeois capitalist, champion of the freedom of the seas and of
the containment of rival powers in the European continent. Global imperialism
started with the great navigations that connected the globe while subduing
African, American and Asian peoples and identities to the benefit of the accumulation,
industrialisation and trade needs of European metropolises. By the same token,
the Eurocentric bias in mainstream human sciences is a reflection of the belief
in the superiority of Western Civilisation, with its military might,
technological breakthroughs and economic networking.
The Entelechy approach also
explains Israel’s determination to reconquer the “Promised Land”, under the
call of the “chosen people”, from which it was expelled by the Romans in 70 AD.
The utopia of returning to the homeland was kept alive for two millennia in the
diaspora, under brutal prosecution. The war mentality has been present for
three millenia – kings Saul and David, resistance against Assyrians,
Babylonians, Seleucids, British and Arabs. Palestine, whose population has
occupied the same “Holy Land” for millennia, also has the same right to a
national State, based on UN resolutions and the “two-State solution”, with the
support the international community, and on the basis of its cultural and
territorial heritage. Both nations deserve to live in peace within recognized
territories and boundaries.
The historical-cultural
perspective also sheds light on the behaviour of strategically important
countries like Turkey, which seem to aspire to recall elements of the Ottoman
Empire, with interests in the Middle East, Europe and the Mediterranean; Japan,
heir of an equally ancient civilisation, attentive to its century-old interests
in Asia, including territories disputed with China and Russia, and open to
Western modernization compatible with their century-old traditions, as the
Meiji enlightenment indicates; Arab countries, islamism and pan-Arabism, that
manifest themsemlves both on religious and secular aspects (intellectual,
trade, science, politics) that go back to the VIIth century AD, streching from
Spain and North Africa to India.
Iran, also an old civilisation,
reached its peak in the VIth century BC, with Cyrus, and experienced other
important periods of develoment and power until the XVIIIth century AD. The
country inherits one of the largest and most cultured empires in History,
stretching from Eastern Europe to India, its rivalry with the West dating back
to the Greek-Persian wars. Having escaped from European imperialism, Iran
entered the circuit of Anglo-American influence under the Pahlevi regim, broken
by the Ayatollah revolution. Iran is both modern and traditional, laic and a
theocratic regime, with ancient rivalry with sunite muslims and eager to
recuperate its regional influence.
Those are but a few possibilities
of empirical research on how the Entelechy paradigm can help explain past
behaviour, understand permanent strategies and interests and anticipate future
developments – based not on power calculations, but on Historical views and
ambitions guided by national identities.
Nevertheless, a note of caution
must be given. The research on identities and heritages as support material for
the Entelechy approach should prioritize endogenous intellectual production,
local thinkers, instead of foreign biased “specialists”. As Edward Said (2019)
rightfully notes, in his critics to the “Orientalism” – a fabrication of the
West, not a true description of the local societies and cultures –, Western
litterature about non-Western realities sometimes stem from arrogant attitudes
designed to simplify and dominate. This discourse often aims at showing the
inferiority of different societies and the superiority of the coloniser,
justifying the actions of the latter.
Perhaps it would not be an
exaggeration to apply Martin Jacques’ (2011) concept of “Civilisation state”
not only to China, but also to the United States, Russia, some European, Asian
and Middle Eastern countries – and even to Brazil, as will be discussed below
–, as representatives of specific cultural heritages and roles on the world
stage.
II – Philosophical assumptions
The philosophical assumptions of
the Entelechy approach would be a combination of Aristotle’s metaphysics
(Aristotle 1999), from which would be taken the concept itself; the ontology of “becoming”, from which would be
borrowed Schopenhauer’s “Will” and Nietzsche’s “Will to Power”; and Heidegger’s
existentialist notion of “Being in the world”. This article will limit itself
to highlight the possibilities provided by those schools.
As already underlined, the Greek etimology of Entelechy (ἐντελέχεια) combines en, “inside” and telos,
“purpose”. This “inner purpose” in Aristotelian philosophy indicates the full
realization of the potential of beings, the transformation of power (active energy) into action,
developing and fulfilling the true essence of a being. Just like every being
contains in itself its final cause and purpose, every Nation State contains in
its cultural identity the essence and purpose, in potential, to be developed
and accomplished.
Since development implies change of the being in the
course of time, it involves the ontology of “becoming”. This movement takes
place in the “being in itself” according to the “inner nature” of the being –
summarized by Schopenhauer as “will” (Kastrup 2020). This “will” is the
fundamental aspect of reality, the driving force in the universe.
Inspired by this view, Nietzsche (1968) affirms that the “Will
to Power” is the main
driving force of mankind, for it pushes it to overcome itself in the pursuit of
mastery and power. Humans have natural ambitions and seek to achieve their
highest goals pushed by their nature, “beyond good and evil”. Applying the
“Will to Power” to society and the State, Nietzsche (1968: 382) notes that the
state has “organized imorality”: internally, through police and penal law;
externally, as “Will” to power, to war, to conquest and to revenge (he
considers neighbouring countries and their allies as enemies).
This implies an Hobbesian view of the international
system. In the dispute of narratives among cultures and civilisations, Nation
States try to “organize imorality” – putting limits to values and behaviours
that do not favour their interests – and disseminate and impose their
discourse, world views and values – if their national capabilities allow it.
Another notion to be
considered in an approach based on Entelechy is Heidegger’s “being in the
world”. In “Being and Time”, Heidegger (1962) discusses the question of the
meaning of being – necessity, structure, priority – and interprets it in terms
of temporality.
In view of the above,
the Entelechy approach can benefit from the ontology of “being in the world”
and “becoming” in order to study the inner nature of Nation States, the factors
of change, their “Will” and, particularly, “Will to Power”. Those perspectives
could be applied in the study of Nation States and their strategies within the
global political environment in the course of History.
III – Theoretical background
An
Entelechy approach fits into the constructivist and historic-culturalist
perspectives, within the framework of the Critical Theory in
International Relations, given its emphasis on ontological epistemology.
Although it challenges
the traditional Realist view, the Entelechy perspective shares some features
with structural, offensive and defensive Realism, combined with elements of the
“Clash of Civilisations” thesis. Indeed, it stresses interstate relations and great power politics from a
cultural angle, assuming the Hobbesian profile of the international society.
From an historic-culturalist
view, International Law
and institutions – key to the Interdependence and Constructivist shools – imply
a Grotian view of human Civilisation. The need for the rule of law on the world
stage, with its emphasis on the sociability of Nation States, International Law
and institutions, will be emphasized by the cultural approach. However, this
tradition is challenged in real-life situations by powerful as well as rogue
states, besides non-state actors.
Likewise, inspired by the Entelechy approach, Behaviouralism would
take cultural identity as a key analytical category in International Relations,
enlarging the epistemologycal space of Anthropology, Sociology and History.
This approach fits into the Constructivist paradigm for it takes into
account the ontological dimension – as seen above – as factors of identity, constitution of agents, structures, perceptions, frameworks of meaning, legitimacy,
decision-making and dialogue. Furthermore, Constructivism contests the
role of political élites and underlines the importance of public support in
policymaking – thus considering the popular sources and representations as
relevant factors of international
politics.
As argued, central concepts in
Entelechy are those of Culture and Identity. Although there is no place in this
article for a deep consideration of both definitions, some key features of the
Identity concept must be underlined. According to Castells (1999: 22-23),
Identity is a set of
cultural attributes built by a differenciation process that constitutes a
source of meaning and experience of a people. Four characteristics of this
concept are useful for the present discussion.
First,
Identity is a double concept, for it refers to sameness and differentiation.
Sameness internally, among the members of the socio-ethnic-cultural community –
etymologically, identity stems from idem (the same). Differentiation
externally, in relation to other communities, often leading to the temptation
to hierarchize higher and lower cultures. The first would try to dominate and
expand, while the latter would tend either to resistance and xenophobic
attitudes, or to capitulation through domestic devaluation or hybridization,
giving way to multiculturalism and tolerance.
Second,
Identity is a perception built socially, culturally and historically, although
it may be based, in many cases, on Biology and Geography. Arnold Toynbee
(1962) studies the genesis of twenty-one Civilisations
through the lenses of the challenges posed by race and the environment, and
their “responses”.
The
social construction of Identity is based on collective memory and on narratives
and utopias. Those, by definition, keep a distance from rationality in a strict
sense, especially if they are built upon mythology and religion (revelations,
destinies, commandments received from above). The “Becoming” mentioned above is
a trip to the u-topos. Since it does
not yet exist, it needs to be built, which requires modifying domestic,
regional and global structures, with the containment or annihilation of
competing views, rules and actors.
Thirdly,
such a construction produces cultural content and meaning. Fourthly, those
contents and meaning unfold in the social, geographical and historical fields,
with impact on the relations of the national society on the world theater.
The
achievement of national goals can last decades, centuries or even millennia.
Cradles of civilisation like China, India, Iran, Turkey or Israel keep
long-term views and goals that can be traced back to Antiquity. Russia,
Germany, France, UK and other European nations, as well as Arab countries, have
experiences, ambitions and strategies with century-old timing the roots of
which can be found in the Middle Ages. Young American nations like the US and
Brazil hold more recent historical experiences, interests and views, their
timing ranging from a few decades to, at most, a couple of centuries – or a
little more, considering the colonial period of Latin America.
Castells
(1999: 24) suggests three forms and origins of identities: legitimacy,
resistance and project. The legitimacy identity is introduced by the leading
actors and institutions of a society, which succeed in expanding and
rationalizing domination over other actors and institutions. This recalls
Bourdieu’s (1987, 2002, 2007) theory of social fields, which underlines the
importance of the cognitive elements that make up the habitus of the field, its doxa
(shared beliefs) and illusio.
One
example of this legitimizing identity is the expansion of Western thinking and
political-social organization, in the forms of Christianism, atheism,
democracy, liberalism, Marxism and nationalism to other continents. Those
cultural contents are assimilated and re-signified by other civilisations, and
sometimes produce a backlash of counter-currents from non-Western cultures.
The second
form is the identity of resistance, exercised by actors holding lower positions
of power. If they are stigmatized and devalued, the reactions may be identity
entrenchment or aggressive stances against the dominant culture, including
religious and ethnic fundamentalism. The North-South dispute, in which
developing countries (South) confront Western values from developed countries
(North) finds a place in here. This is particularly true in the de-colonisation
movement (1940s-1970s) and the modernisation and cosmopolitanism brought about
by globalisation. The latter is highlighted by Castells (1999: 18), who points
out that powerful expressions of collective identity are challenged by
globalisation and give rise to a fierce defence of cultural uniqueness.
The
third form is the project identity, according to which societies undergo
changes aimed at higher stages of materialization of their potentials. Although
Castells applies the concept to individuals and groups, it is possible to
extend its scope to the development of entire nations. The project identity is,
in this sense, the research field of Entelechy.
Duroselle (2000) argues that the “deep forces” –
economics, geography, demography, the “national sentiment” – underly systems of
“causality” and “purpose”, in which there is a “strategic calculation” by
international agents according to the perceived objectives, means, risks and
the quality of the information available. Such elements unfold over time in
“movements” of peaceful relations and conflicts that produce “birth, life and
death” of empires (tout empire périra). Similarly, Paul Kennedy (2017) analyses
the “rise and fall of the great powers” relating economic, technological and
military factors, particularly taking into consideration investments in defence
capabilities and the sustainability of the geographical expansion and
maintenance of empires.
The
“movements” mentioned by Duroselle often take the form of “waves” in
international relations, such as demography and economy. Although not mentioned
by Duroselle as such, the cultural-identity factor could be counted among “wave
movements” provoking changes in international relations.
The Entelechy approach suggests that the cultural fator, notably
national Identity, is a major player in the causal system of international
relations, particularly State behaviour. It builds upon the assumption that politics and economics are
ethnocentric by nature, and their interests and rationality aim at the
realization of the potential of Nation
States, according to their civilisational features and ambitions.
In this perspective, national development must be envisaged as a
cultural undertaking, a civilisation project. This recalls Manuel
Castells’ (1999: 24) “project identity”. Development plans are national projects designed to accomplish
socioeconomic changes, with impact on the world stage, in order to materialize
the full potential of the Nation State.
With no intent to propose cultural determinism,
the Entelechy approach seeks to understand the rationale and behaviour of
Nation States in the framework of a more complex system of causality and
variables. This adds new inputs to power reasoning and cost-benefit
calculations, and bring to the equation History, Psychology, Ecology,
Philosophy, Anthropology, Sociology, Geoeconomics, as well as traditional
skills for institutional organization, resilience, mobilisation and struggle
for identity.
As said above, the Entelechy approach combines
Constructivism,
Historical-Culturalism, and a Realism à
la carte – elements from classical, structural, offensive and defensive
realism, also taking into consideration the “clash of Civilisations”
hypothesis.
From the classical Realism the
Entelechy approach borrows the anarchical
and Hobbesian characterisation of the international system and the
State-based approach, although seen not from a power-led perspective, but from
the achievement of the development potential of national societies as
representatives of specific Civilisations. The Entelechy approach is close to
Morgenthau’s traditional Realism, to whom it is human nature, and the search
for power (reminding the “Will to power”), that defines the profile of international
relations; but instead of human nature in the abstract sense, Entelechy will
search how this human nature creates cultures, identities and civilisations and
their quest for the accomplishment of their potential.
Mearsheimer’s (2001) Structural Realism
is useful to the Entelechy perspective for its emphasis on the structure or
architecture of the international system as the key to explaining how States
behave. On the other hand, the Entelechy approach differs from Mearsheimer’s
when he affirms that it is the international system determines the State
behaviour, not domestic politics. The Entelechy approach emphasizes inner
ambitions for the development and realization of possibilities, and, more
broadly, the configuration of national values, institutions and conflict
solving techniques. Certainly State behaviour results from a combination of
both external and internal inputs, possibilities and limitations, but Entelechy
emphacizes inner cultural and identity factors.
Moreover, while Entelechy shares
with Structural Realism the belief in an international structure, it emphasizes
that it results not from mere political power confrontations, but from a
perspective of “Clash of Civilisations”.
IV – Entelechy and the “Clash of Civilisations”
The
approach focused on Entelechy may help understand and evaluate the scope and
the limits of the “Clash of Civilisations” thesis. Arnold Toynbee (1976) believed that the confrontation of
Western Civilisation with other societies and civilisations was the major event
of the XXth century.
It is
worth noting the contrast between Toynbee’s and Huntington’s views. For Toynbee
– who published his “Clash of Civilisations” in 1953, in the early years of the
Cold War and prior to the launching of the Third World and Non-Alignment
movements in the Bandung Conference, and the expansion of decolonisation –, the
West was the aggressor, and it was suffering the backlashes or blows struck by
the “victims” (Toynbee 1976:
202-203). Conversely, Huntington, four decades later, in the
context of post-Cold War globalisation, believes that it is the West the victim
of aggression from other civilisations.
In
his “Study of History”, Toynbee (1962) lists twenty-one civilisations. In
addition to these, he (1976: 203, 210) highlights the major actors that
confront the West, inviting to think of conflicts not in terms of States, but
of Civilisations: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and the Far East. According to this view, instead
of Nation States, conflicts should in fact be considered from the broader
category of Civilisations. The behaviour, interests and power strategies of
Nation States are actually those of representatives of those Civilisations.
Today,
the representatives of those civilisational matrices are Russia (Orthodox
Christianity), China (Far East) and Islam. Islamic extremism, Iran, Russia and
China are mentioned as threats to US national security (United States of
America, 2018).
Bringing the Toynbeean view to the present time, these would be the
actors of the “anti-Western counter-offensive” (Toynbee 1976: 208). On the
other hand, Hinduism (India) poses no threat; as for the Far East, Japan is no
longer a threat; but so is North Korea.
Darcy
Ribeiro (1988: 87-99) proposes four historical-cultural configurations for
non-European peoples: witnesses, new, transplanted and emerging. The “witness
peoples” (povos testemunhos) are
today’s representatives of old autonomous Civilisations challenged by the
European colonial expansion: China, Japan, Corea, Arab countries. Among those,
only China and Japan were highly successful in incorporating the modern
industrial technology in their economies and relaunching their societies on new
grounds.
The
“new peoples” (povos novos) result
from the European expansion in the Americas and the intermingling and
acculturation among Indians, Africans and Europeans. They formed asymetric
societies and only partially succeeded in modernizing themselves and
incorporating industrial technology, producing huge socioeconomic gaps. Brazil,
Mexico and Colombia are examples.
On
their part, “transplanted peoples” (povos
transplantados) are former colonies that maintained overseas the ethnic
profile of their European origins, with their language and culture, founding
modern societies: United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand. Darcy Ribeiro
also counts in this group the “neo-European enclaves” of Israel and South
Africa, as well as Argentina and Uruguay (I would add Chile), although
socioeconomic hardships undermined the achievements of the last ones.
The
“emerging peoples” (povos emergentes)
are the new Nation States from Africa and Asia victims of European
colonisation. They emerged in a few decades from tribal configurations or
trading factories to the State level, often with plurinational features and
artificially imposed boundaries that lead to permanent tensions.
According
to Darcy Ribeiro (1988: 34-35), these four categories evolve in Civilisation
processes in two opposed ways. The first one is the “speedy evolution” (aceleração evolutiva), that takes place in societies capable of
autonomously generating new technology, enhancing economic growth and achieving
social progress. They succeed in maintaining and developing their own
ethnic-cultural features – and even expand it to other peoples and nations. The
European nations and the “transplanted peoples”, notably the US, fit into this
description, but also, increasingly, some “witness peoples” like China and
Japan.
The
second way is the “historical updating” (atualização histórica). This takes place
among peoples that suffer impacts from more developed societies –
technologically, economically and intitutionally –, and are subdued by them.
They lose autonomy and suffer cultural traumas. Nevertheless, some undergo
domestic revolutions that push for modernization and assimilate European and
North-American values, institutions and techniques, which enable them to
achieve “historical updating”. This is the case of “witnesses”, “new”, and
“emerging peoples” like Brazil, India, Turkey, and some Arab, Asian and African
countries.
The
concept of Civilisation, as an analytical category, declined in importance in
the four decades that followed Toynbee’s writings. Nevertheless, it was taken
up by Samuel Huntington (1993, 1998), who applied the “Clash of Civilisations”
under a geopolitical perspective (Hall 2018). Huntington’s approach, which
could be characterized as “pessimistic-realist”, is a counterpoint to the
optimistic view of the unipolar hegemonic moment that marked the early years of
the post-Cold War.
The
triumphalistic and euphoric perception of post-bipolarity, with the rapid
advance of neoliberal globalisation over the rubble of the Socialist
experience, was hailed as the “End of History” (Fukuyama 1989). In response to his critics, Fukuyama
(2018: xii) argues that he had used the word “end” not in the sense of
“termination”, but rather “target” or “objective”. In this teleological
perception, the liberal, market economy and society would be the highest
achievement of contemporary History.
In this sense, the West, defined as the
combination of market economy, individualism, the rule of law and
representative democracy, would have engendered a superior society, the cutting
edge of Civilisation.
This ethnocentric view has brought heavy criticism to the “Clash of
Civilisations” thesis, qualified as a “myth” (Said 2005).
Multipolar
systems have been seen as more prone to wars than bipolar systems, which are
more structured and predictable. As a consequence, in the post-Cold War multipolar
environment, the great Civilisations (Western, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox,
Buddhist, Japanese, Latin American, African) would tend to collide.
This
pessimistic and conflicting view is adopted by John Mearsheimer’s “offensive
realism”. In his analysis of the “tragedy of the great power politics”,
Mearsheimer (2001) underlines the offensive behaviour of the emerging
revisionist countries.
In an anarchic
context, hegemonic politics would lead to tragedy, because the big players are
not satisfied with the distribution of power, while emerging powers demand
structural changes in international organizations and governance.
An
attempt to understand the present moment in International Relations would
combine the pessimistic interpretations of Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism”
and Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations”, giving rise to what could be defined
as an “offensive Identity Realism”. This approach would be post-neorealist (rescuing
state-centric realism), post-globalist, post-neoliberal (isolationist,
protectionist, strengthening borders and divisions) and post-multilateral
(return to nationalist and unilateral postures).
Both
“offensive” and “defensive” Realisms would help understand how clashing
Civilisations – through the Nation States that represent them – devise their
strategies, according to cultural values of aggressiveness, revenge, resistence
and resilience. Those actors would seek to combine classic hard military and
economic power, soft power and cyber power, in a broad strategy of “smart
power” (Nye 2011). Their aim would be to reshape their regions and the world to
make room for their development and accomplish their full potential as Nations.
This
Realism would be “offensive” against non-Western actors, as those object to Western
values and institutions (globalisation, market economy, liberal democracy). This recalls the bipolarity,
deterrence and containment of the 1950s and 1960s. This also helps explain the
reaction against Russian actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and
against China in Asia, Africa, Latin America – as well as the asymmetric
conflicts and hybrid wars against non-state actors.
While
the liberal perspective in International Relations, partially inspired by
Kant’s paradigm, believes in the integration of China in the international
system, offensive Realism sees it as an existential threat to the West,
especially to the US. Mearsheimer (2006) affirms that the rise of China will
not be peaceful, for it will strive to become hegemonic in Asia and will compete
with the US and Western powers in other continents; such “peer competition” is
not tolerated by the US.
The
result is the resurgence of arms escalation, both conventional and nuclear,
magnified by the fast progress of emerging warfare technologies. It is
noteworthy that those technologies – hypersonic missiles, cyber and
electromagnetic warfare, lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS, based on
artificial intelligence), armamentism in outer space, laser cannons – still
lack specific regulation in international law, particularly humanitarian law[1].
This
“offensive realism” is also “identitarian”, for it is inspired by the “Clash of
Civilisations” approach, with ideological justifications as potent forces of
mobilization and persuasion in favor or against the superiority of Western
values. The identitarian realism is anti-globalist, protectionist,
anti-multilateral, isolationist and neo-nationalist.
Fukuyama
warns about the importance of identity (Fukuyama, 1993, 2018). In his view, the “demand for dignity”
of identity groups generates a “politics of resentment” that gives rise to the
upsurge of “old-fashioned nationalisms”. In his analysis of identity movements,
human History is driven by a struggle: the universal recognition of contents
such as nation, religion, race, ethnic, gender. The rise of identity politics in
modern liberal democracies, in his view, also constitutes a threat, and needs
to be dealt with by a universal understanding of human dignity (Fukuyama, 2018:
xvi).
The Entelechy approach would address the
following scenarios for the outcome of the “Clash of
Civilisations”: i) Huntington’s solution, the struggle for the maintenance of
Western supremacy, which will be increasingly contested, both culturally and
militarily, among states and/or non-state actors, in the form of identitarian
confrontations, wars and terrorism; ii) multipolar accommodation, with the
persistence of conflicts, but in a sublimated format, without translating
themselves into armed conflicts; and iii) the emergence of a new hybrid
universal culture, as wished by Toynbee, based upon globalized
multiculturalism, tolerance and diversity.
V – Entelechy in Brazil: diplomacy for tropical
development[2]
A
Brazilian Entelechy would seek to materialize the full development of the country’s
potential as a vibrant, mixed culture in a tropical environment. I would also
seek to project its values on a world scale through a diplomacy promoting
sustainable development, cooperation, human rights and peace. Gilberto Freyre’s
Sociology leads in this direction.
In New world in the tropics, Freyre (1959: 166) proposes a “Brazilian
Foreign Policy as conditioned by Brazil’s ethnic, cultural and geographical
situation”. Freyre believes that the features of the Brazilian
socio-cultural identity – a result of genetic, cultural and ecological
symbiosis – constitute the country’s major contribution to Civilisation.
Freyre pictures Brazil as “an European civilisation in
the tropics” (Idem: 141, 165, 181).
[Brazil] is not a mere sub-European civilisation. It
is predominantly European, but not entirely European. In some respects it is
extra-European: it seeks to adapt itself to conditions and possibilities that
are not European but tropical (Idem: 145).
He believes that Brazil’s development would produce
a new type of civilisation, … (a) modern
civilisation in the tropics whose predominant traits are European, but whose
perspectives … are extra-European (Idem: 146).
Nevertheless, Freyre warns:
This does not imply that Brazilians, by being
carriers, in a sociological sense, of a civilisation that must be considered,
in its decisive traits, a renewal of a Christian European civilisation, are
only and passively an expression of a sub-European civilisation. They are
increasingly becoming ultra-European. They have been developing more and more
as a renewal of Western civilisation in the American hemisphere and as an
artificial preservation of European values and cultural styles in a tropical
area of America in which physical conditions have been and are the first to
call for adaptation of the same values and styles to new surroundings (Idem:
153).
This recalls Darcy Ribeiro’s
categories of Civilisations: Freyre implies that Brazil is not a “transplanted
people” from Europe, but rather a “new people”, formed by European values
adapted to the tropical environment and a multirracial society composed of
European Whites, Amerindians and African Blacks, among other ethnic stocks. The
configuration of this Brazilian “new people” leads to the promotion of core
values like pluralism, multiculturalism, ethnic-cultural diversity, human
development and adaptation to the
challenges imposed by the tropical environment. Those values are the cornerstone
of Brazilian traditional diplomacy.
In Homem, Cultura e Trópico, Freyre (1962:
41, 50 e 94) argues that Brazil, as the “leader of the
Luso-tropical civilisation”, should play a mediator role between Europe and
tropical countries. Having pioneered the “History of Mentalities” and of
“material culture” in Brazil, the sociologist does not reach this conclusion on
the basis of conventional diplomacy, rational calculations of power or
projection of strategic interests: he proposes a “cultural policy” – a
predecessor of Nye’s “soft power”.
Freyre (1959: 142) sees Brazil
like an American Russia or a tropical China, … the
greatest, or at least the most advanced, modern civilisation so far developed
in a tropical region.
In
this perspective, it would be valid to apply Martin Jacques’ (2011) concept of
“Civilisation state” (see above) to Brazil. Gilberto Freyre (1953: 176 and 1961: 41) is disappointed with
Toynbee, for did not count Luso-tropicalism among the great Civilisations. In
spite of this, Toynbee did recognize that the Brazilian miscegenation and
cultural fusion may inspire other nations and help conflict solving (Fundação Gilberto Freyre, 1976: 25 and 1980: 450).
Shortly
after the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955, Freyre began to advocate
that Brazil should adopt a Foreign Policy guided by “tropicalist” values, with
emphasis on relations with the “young nations of the East and Africa”, in the
process of de-colonisation, as well as with Latin America.
Freyre
proposes a Brazilian Foreign Policy with emphasis on relations with tropical
nations through actions of socioeconomic development and the formation of
cultural and ecological alliances. In the early years of the bipolar
confrontation, and before the birth of Third World and the Non-Alignment
movement, Freyre envisioned what today is known as South-South solidarity in
the quest for a multipolar international system (Candeas, 2016).
Discovering
proto-Third-World and developmentalist elements in Freyre’s thought challenges
the mainstream view in Brazilian Sociology that pictures him as an “organic
intellectual” representative of national conservatism and ideologue of
Salazarist neocolonialism. In the same way Freyre raises senzalas and mucambos to
a “civilisational status”, alongside casas-grandes
and sobrados, and celebrates the
extraordinary contribution of the Black population and Indians to the Brazilian
culture and society, he also advocates the raising of tropical countries to a
higher standard of dignity and contribution to the world Civilisation. This
should be carried out, in his view, by means of a tropical, cultural and
ecological diplomacy, scientifically based upon a “tropicology” – a systematic
set of scientific and empirical knowledge applied to development in the tropics.
The
sociologist sees Brazil as the leader of a modern tropical Civilisation, a
“European civilisation in the tropics” shaped by the “acclimation” of European
values, to be harmonized with non-European cultural and ecological
contributions. He also sees Latin America as a continent “too European and
Western” to be considered entirely exotic, and too exotic to be treated as a
mere European extension. On the other hand, it does not favor Pan Americanism.
As
already pointed out, Freyre considers Brazil an “American Russia”, due to its
extension and unity in diversity. On the other hand, in his view, China and
India would not have the same combination of ethnic plurality with linguistic
and cultural unity found in Brazil.
Freyre’s
reflections in New world in the tropics (1959)
on Brazil’s relations with Africa, China, India and Russia can contribute to a
historical and cultural narrative about the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa). Almost five centuries before Jim O’Neill (2001) suggested to
Goldman Sachs the G7 articulation with the BRICs, those nations already had
been brought closer by Portuguese and Spanish sailors and traders, with
transcontinental exchanges of material culture through techniques, plants,
animals and spices.
Freyre
believes that Brazil would have a special responsibility in bringing West and
East together, and bridge gaps between Europe and tropical nations. Its
tropical colonization and miscegenation would legitimize the country’s
contribution to the relations between “whites and coloured peoples”. Freyre
favors the emancipation of tropical peoples. He proposes that the leaders of
African liberation movements should come into closer contact, not with Soviet
communists or American liberals, but with Brazilians. Indeed, Brazil may be
considered the second largest “African country” (second to Nigeria), given the
demographic importance of its Black population and its fundamental contribution
to the country’s society, economy, and culture.
The
sociologist upholds regionalism as a key model for transnational organisation
of the international system. Inspired by his Luso-tropicalism, a transregional
entity, he places regional Sociology, understood as social or human ecology, at
the centre of his world view. As a consequence, he proposes close relations
among regions with ecological and cultural similarities, notably tropical ones.
The
Entelechy approach is aligned with Freyre’s insights and the Foreign Policy he
proposes to Brazil: a diplomacy guided by peace, cooperation, development and
solidarity inspired by the national values of ethnical and cultural
miscegenation and tropicality – in the sense of sustainable development
respectful of ecological possibilities and specificities. This approach opens
broad avenues for Brazilian diplomatic action vis à vis developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean,
Africa and Asia, as well as a “bridging” role with developed countries of
Europe and North America. Freyre sees Brazil as a leader of developing nations,
and the champion of the Civilisation values of tolerance, mutual respect,
cooperation and development.
Besides racial and cultural
miscegenation and tropical ecology, Brazil’s identity is marked by an
impressive territory: world’s fifth surface area and population, world’s third
longest borderline (over 16 thousand km) with ten neighbours, large coastline
(over 7 thousand km), projecting a 5,7 million square km jurisdiction in the
Atlantic Ocean (the “Blue Amazon” – exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf), and often placed among the top ten GDPs.
Brazil is “geopolitically satisfied”
since the finishing touches made by the Baron of Rio Branco on the outline of
its large borders, applying methods of peaceful settlement of disputes with
neighbouring countries, building upon the Madrid Treaty of 1750 between
Portugal and Spain drafted by Alexandre de Gusmão. As Oswaldo Aranha puts it
(apud Corrêa do Lago 2017: 208), Brazil does not have rights to claim, nor
borders to expand: Brazilians are happy within their own territory and
satisfied with their institutions; they do not wish to expand, neither aspire
to dominance; they do not have ambitions or envies.
There is awareness of the vastness
of its natural resources and potential for technological and industrial development.
According to the National Defence Policy and Strategy (Ministério da Defesa
2020), those assets give Brazil growing international power. Considering
possible interest conflicts that may arise, Defence documents state that Brazil
will always stand for Peace, dialogue and negotiated settlement of disputes, as
proved by its History. Nevertheless, global instabilities and security threats
lead Brazil not to overlook its Defence sector and deterrence capabilities.
The vastness of human and natural resources
leads Brazil to believe it deserves a world power status. Some put it with
irony and disappointment: “Brazil is the country of the future, and will always
be”. On the other hand, on an optimistic tone, Oswaldo Aranha affirmed that
Brazil “is the future” (porvir), and
will be “big with, without or even against our own will” (com, ou sem, e até contra a nossa vontade) (apud Corrêa do Lago
2017: 364). This faith in the Brazilian great future is resilient: it may be
questioned in times of crisis but re-emerges when there is progress, in cycles
of depression and euphoria (ufanismo).
Conclusion
A Brazilian Entelechy approach would
picture the accomplishment of its potential as a Nation. This fulfillment is
not an easy, quick and linear path, as many – including myself – would have
dreamed of during our youth in the 1980s, when the country reaffirmed its
democratic values enshrined in the 1988 Constitution – that also formally
established the principles of its Foreign Policy – after two decades of military
dictatorship. The Entelechy approach serves as a guide to Brazilian Foreign
Policy in order to help the country achieve its best and most accomplished
version of itself.
Recalling the linguistic metaphor proposed in the
Introduction, Brazil may contribute to the Civilisation discourse with
sentences and paragraphs that convey a message of democracy, miscegenation,
universalism, ecumenism, multiculturalism, mutual respect and tolerance among
cultures, religions and races. Those are constitutive elements of the finest
version of the Brazilian Civilisation – that struggles with antithetical values
unfortunately also rooted in our society – in its permanent search for peace and
sustainable development, human dignity and social justice both inside the
nation and on the world scene.
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